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DUE PROCESS AND COMMERCE CLAUSE
CONSIDERATIONS UNDER THE WEST VIRGINIA
BUSINESS AND OCCUPATION AND CARRIER
INCOME TAXES - J.C. PENNEY TO MILACRON
ROBERT G. LATHROP*
I. INTRODUCTION
From December 1979, when it decided J.C. Penney Co. v. Hardesty,1 to
mid-February 1982, when it decided Cincinnati Milacron Co. v. Hardesty,2 the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was unusually active in the state tax-
ation area. The court handed down eleven opinions, on seventeen cases, deal-
ing primarily with the West Virginia Business and Occupation Tax (B & 0
Tax) and secondarily with the West Virginia Carrier Income Tax.3 That the B
& 0 Tax was the subject of the bulk of the litigation is not surprising since it is
by far the most pervasive broad-based business tax in the state. The tax
reaches nearly all businesses and professions and of all state taxes, it raises the
greatest amount of revenue for the general fund.4 Although the Carrier Income
* B.A., Washington & Lee University; LL.B., Washington & Lee University School of Law,
LL.M., New York University School of Law; Associate Professor, West Virginia University College
of Law.
The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of his student researcher, Joseph
J. Miller, in preparing this article.
264 S.E.2d 604 (W. Va. 1979).
2 290 S.E.2d 902 (W. Va. 1982).
Id.; West Virginia Tractor & Equipment Co. v. Hardesty, 280 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1981)
(includes Wright-Thomas Equip. Co. v. Hardesty); Capitol Cablevision Corp. v. Hardesty, 285
S.E.2d 412 (W. Va. 1981); Southern States Coop., Inc. v. Dailey, 280 S.E.2d 821 (W. Va. 1981);
Western Md. Ry. v. Goodwin, 282 S.E.2d 240 (W. Va. 1981) (includes West Virginia Motor Deliv-
ery Co. v. Goodwin; Union Barge Line Corp. v. Hardesty); Martha White Mills v. Dailey, 280
S.E.2d 238 (W. Va. 1981); Koppers Co. v. Dailey, 280 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1981); Gilbert Imported
Hardwoods, Inc. v. Dailey, 280 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1981); Bishop Coal Co. v. Dailey, 276 S.E.2d 220
(W. Va. 1981); Newell Bridge & Ry. Co. v. Dailey, 266 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 942 (1981); J.C. Penney Co. v. Hardesty, 264 S.E.2d 604 (W. Va. 1980) (includes Pittsburgh-
Des Moines Steel Co. v. Goodwin; Richardson, Gordon & Assoc. v. Hardesty; and Sturgeon v.
Roberts).
The Office of Hearings and Appeals of the State Tax Department also has been active. Several
administrative decisions which relate generally to the subject at hand are Administrative Decisions
82-16-B, 82-9-B, 82-5-B, 81-32-B, 81-30-B, 81-16-B, 81-12-B.
' For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1982, the B & 0 Tax generated $518,502,546.72. Total
1
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Tax contributes far less to the general fund than does the B & 0 Tax,' it is,
nevertheless, a significant tax considering the revenue it does raise. Further-
more, the B & 0 Tax and Carrier Income Tax are similar to the extent that
they both are imposed on gross receipts.6 However, the Carrier Income Tax is
imposed on net income which arises from interstate activities7 while no such
modification exists under the B & 0 Tax.
The goal of this article is to analyze and comment upon the due process
and commerce clause issues raised in these decisions with an eye to apprising
attorneys who do not deal with taxes on a continuing basis of the present pos-
ture of the court in this area. A consistent pattern will emerge out of the analy-
sis which can be used as a rough guide for practical handling of often confusing
and troublesome concepts.
II. GENERAL NATURE OF B & 0 TAX AND CARRIER INCOME TAX
The B & 0 Tax is a tax on the gross receipts of a business for the privilege
of engaging in that business for profit in West Virginia.8 The statute imposing
the tax enumerates various taxable activities and sets a rate for each. The B &
o Tax is not considered a series of separate taxes, however, but rather is
viewed as a single privilege tax imposing different rates on different activities.9
Properly categorizing particular activities is the major source of controversy
between taxpayers and the State Tax Department, aside from questions over
constitutional issues.10
general fund revenues for the same period were $1,265,913,052.45. Letter from Herschel H. Rose,
III., State Tax Commissioner, to Robert G. Lathrop, October 8, 1982.
5 For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1982, the Carrier Income Tax generated $21,736,351.87.
Id.
6 The B & 0 Tax is levied on certain privileges "in the amounts to be determined by applica-
tion of rates against values or gross income ...... W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2 (1974 & Supp. 1982). The
Code then defines "gross income" to mean "the gross receipts of the taxpayer. . . ." W. VA. CODE
§ 11-13-1 (1974). Likewise, the Carrier Income Tax imposes an annual tax on "the gross income
from all business." W. VA. CODE § 11-12A-2 (1974 & Supp. 1982).
7 W. VA. CODE § 11-12A-3 (1974 & Supp. 1982) provides: "In addition to the tax imposed in
the preceding section [§ 11-12A-2], every motor vehicle carrier operating on the public highways of
the State ... shall pay an annual tax for each calendar year on the net income earned within the
State. .. "
" W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2 (1974 & Supp. 1982).
" Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. Battle, 151 W. Va. 655, 659, 154 S.E.2d 854, 856 (1967).
10 The obvious reason for the categorization disputes is the taxpayer's desire to minimize its
taxes. If an enterprise is able to treat its business activity, or one of its business activities, as
taxable at the manufacturing rate of .0088 (W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2b (1974 & Supp. 1982)), rather
than at the coal extraction rate of .035 (W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2a(1) (Supp. 1982)), then that busi-
ness will realize a substantial tax saving. Occasionally the interplay of the value of a particular
item at a certain stage in its movement toward a final disposition and the value of it at the time of
disposition may induce the taxpayer to classify its business activities in more than one category.
For example, in Gilbert Imported Hardwoods, Inc. v. Dailey, 280 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1981), the
court held that the taxpayer was involved in both the production of coal and the manufacturing
(the tippling operation) of coal. In response, the legislature amended the law to clarify that, in this
type of integrated operation, the only category under which the taxpayer should be taxed is as a
coal producer. W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2a(1) (Supp. 1982) (effective April 1, 1980).
A problem similar to the one in Gilbert Hardwoods arose in Bishop Coal Co. v. Dailey, 276
[Vol. 85
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The Carrier Income Tax is imposed upon the gross receipts of certain
transportation companies generated by their transportation activity within
West Virginia. Telephone and telegraph companies doing business within the
state are also subject to the Carrier Income Tax."' The rates are .033 on gross
receipts from transportation and telegraph companies and .0374 on gross re-
ceipts from telephone companies.1 2 Trucking companies, in certain situations,
are subject only to tax on their net incomes.13
Where a taxpayer's business activities cross state lines, a tax is imposed on
the net income attributed to West Virginia activity by means of mileage for-
mulas. 14 The rates are .066 of net income for transportation and telegraph
companies and .0374 of net income for telephone companies. 15 If the gross re-
ceipts portion of the Carrier Income Tax is applicable to a taxpayer, then the
total net income of the taxpayer is reduced when computing the net income
portion of the tax. The reduction is accomplished by a fraction, the numerator
of which is the gross income subject to the gross income tax, and the denomi-
nator of which is total gross income. 16
Since the Carrier Income Tax is a hybrid between a pure gross receipts
tax, such as the B & 0 Tax, and a pure net income tax, such as the Corporate
Net Income Tax,17 issues arise under it which are associated with both kinds of
taxes.
III. DUE PROCESS AND COMMERCE CLAUSE ISSUES
While challenges to the imposition of the B & 0 Tax and Carrier Income
Tax under the United States Constitution can be, and often are, based upon
S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1981), where coal was mined in Virginia but tippled in West Virginia. The
court held that the entire receipts from the sale of coal were subject to the manufacturing rate
because all the manufacturing occurred in West Virginia, none occurring in Virginia. Whether the
change in the law arising out of Gilbert Hardwoods will change the result in Bishop Coal is ques-
tionable because the language in the amended version of W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2a(1) (Supp. 1982)
applies only to "coal mined and produced in this State in the exercise of the production privi-
lege. . . ." (emphasis added).
See also West Virginia Tractor & Equip. Co. v. Hardesty, 280 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1981) (the
issue was whether the taxpayer was selling tangible property carrying a rate of .0055 (wholesale
.0027), W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2c (1974), or leasing it, carrying a rate of .0115, W. VA. CODE § 11-13-
2i (1974)); Martha White Mills v. Dailey, 280 S.E.2d 238 (W. Va. 1981) (the alternative rates at
issue were .0088 for dressing and processing food, or .0027 for dressing and processing food to be
sold at wholesale, W. VA. CODE §§ 11-13-2b and 11-13-2c (1974 & Supp. 1982)); Koppers Co. v.
Dailey, 280 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1981) (the alternative rates at issue were contracting at .022, W.
VA. CODE § 11-13-2e (1974) or services at .0115, W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2h (1974)).
Another reason for attempting to categorize a business activity as "manufacturing" is to take
advantage of the credits for industrial expansion or revitalization. W. VA. CODE § 11-13C-1 to -5
(1974 & Supp. 1982), and W. VA. CODE § 11-13D-1 to -6 (Supp. 1982) (effective July 1, 1981).
1 W. VA. CODE § 11-12A-2 (1974 & Supp. 1982).
12 Id.
" W. VA. CODE § 11-12A-2 (second proviso) (Supp. 1982) (effective March 8, 1980).
14 W. VA. CODE § 11-12A-3 (1974 & Supp. 1982).
I /d.
l W. VA. CODE § 11-12A-3(g) (1974 & Supp. 1982).
17 W. VA. CODE § 11-24-1 to -40 (1974 & Supp. 1982).
1983]
3
Lathrop: Due Process and Commerce Clause Considerations under the West Vir
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1983
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
several clauses in that document, the two most common challenges are based
upon the due process clause' 8 and the commerce clause.19 Due process and
commerce clause considerations are relevant in state taxation of interstate
transactions because they establish certain limits beyond which a taxing juris-
diction may not go in imposing its tax on out-of-state enterprises which carry
on business within its borders.20
A. Due Process Clause
Due process involves two elements: finding jurisdiction to tax at all, and
finding a "rational relationship" between the income taxed and the activities
carried on in the taxing state.2 1 Ordinarily, the jurisdictional question presents
no difficulty because the threshold is easily met. It is the "rational relation-
ship" which normally creates the due process hurdle inviting scrutiny by the
courts. "Rational relationship" problems traditionally arise in a net income tax
setting.2 2 Even so, a gross income tax, such as the B & 0 Tax, still lends itself,
in some instances, to the question whether jurisdiction to tax exists at all; or if
it does exist, whether it exists only with respect to particular activities.
28
2' "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
19 "The Congress shall have Power . . .To regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States. . . ." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
30 Numerous articles have been written on the subject of due process and commerce clause
considerations with respect to gross receipts taxes. One of the best compact discussions appears in
Report of Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 565,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033-61 (1965) [hereinafter cited as the Willis Subcommittee Report]. In the
course of the discussion the major articles written up to 1965 are cited.
For a general treatment of this area one should not overlook J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLER-
STEIN, STATE AND LocAL TAxATION 274-306 (4th ed. 1978 & Supp. 1982).
Additional articles worthy of note are Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transac-
tions (Ain't God Tough on Indiana), 47 COLUM. L. REV. 211 (1947); W. Hellerstein, State Taxa-
tion and the Supreme Court: Toward a More Unified Approach to Constitutional Adjudication,
75 hicH. L. REv. 1426 (1977); W. Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Su-
preme Court, 1974 Term: Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L. Rav. 149
(1976); J. Hellerstein, State Tax Discrimination Against Out-of-Staters, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 113
(1977); J. Hellerstein, State Taxation Under the Commerce Clause: An Historical Perspective, 29
VAND. L. REv. 335 (1976); Lockhart, A Revolution in State Taxation of Commerce?, 65 MINN. L.
REv. 1025 (1981); Simet, The Concept of "Nexus" and State Use and Unapportioned Gross Re-
ceipts Taxes, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 112 (1978); State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: An Analysis
of Current Standards Promulgated by the United State Supreme Court-Department of Revenue
v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 205 (1978); Developments in
the Law - Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HAMe. L. REv. 953
(1962).
" See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980).
:2 Id.









The framers of the United States Constitution designed the commerce
clause to prevent states from inhibiting the free flow of commerce among
them.24 It is clear today, though it was not always so, that states may impose
not only a net income tax on fairly apportioned net income derived solely from
interstate commerce25 but also may impose a privilege tax on income derived
solely from interstate commerce.26 However, the tax must be applied to an ac-
tivity "with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, [be] fairly apportioned,
... not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [be] fairly related to
the services provided by the State. '' 27 Generally speaking, the major considera-
tion now under the commerce clause is whether the particular business activity
is actually taxed in more than one state. To avoid or correct multiple taxation,
states must either apportion the tax base among themselves or forego taxation
so that another state may tax the activity in toto.
The vice of multiple taxation is the imposition of tax on the same income
arising from activities which happen to take place in more than one state. Mul-
tiple taxation thus places a burden on the interstate business not borne by the
solely intrastate business. For example, as noted in Western Live Stock v. Bu-
reau of Revenue,28 "a state may not lay a tax measured by the amount of mer-
chandise carried in interstate commerce [citation omitted], or upon the freight
earned by its carriage."2 9
If the tax is fairly apportioned to the in-state activity generating the tax
base, then the vice of multiple taxation does not exist. Western Live Stock was
one of the earlier decisions setting forth this principle. In Western Live Stock,
a New Mexico newspaper publisher sold advertising to out-of-state advertisers
and circulated the paper to in-state and out-of-state subscribers. The state im-
posed a 2% tax on advertising receipts upon one engaged in the business of
publishing newspapers. The Court found that the tax fell only on the in-state
activity of publishing the newspaper and that the sales price of the advertising
was only the measure of the tax, not the activity taxed. The Court held there
could be no multiple burden because the publishing activity was purely local
and could be taxed by no state other than New Mexico."
24 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
25 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
11 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). Complete Auto overruled
Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), which had held that a franchise tax,
though measured by net income, could not be imposed on income generated solely in interstate
commerce. There was a minor question whether the income was really from an intrastate business
(430 U.S. at 275-76, n.2), but the Court viewed the income as arising solely from interstate com-
merce (Id. at 276 n.4) and reaffirmed that characterization of it in Department of Revenue v.
Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 745 and 748-49 (1978).
27 Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279. This test, based on economic reality, has been the touch-
stone for all interstate taxation cases following Complete Auto.
18 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
29 Id. at 256.
30 Id. at 260.
1983]
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2. Summary of Recent Gross Receipts Tax Decisions
At this juncture it will be helpful for later reference to summarize the
more recent United States Supreme Court decisions involving commerce clause
issues under a gross receipts tax.
In 1951, the Court decided Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue.3 1 In
Norton, the Court found that while some sales were local in nature and there-
fore taxable by Illinois, certain sales of property were purely interstate, unre-
lated to any local activity, and thus could not be subjected to Illinois' gross
receipts tax.
In 1964, in General Motors Corp. v. Washington,3 2 the Court held in a 5-4
decision that Washington could tax, in full, receipts from sales with interstate
elements without any apportionment. The Court reached this conclusion be-
cause the interstate sales activities were so intertwined with General Motors'
local activities. Activities constituted the subject of the tax; the sales proceeds
were simply the measure of that tax.
In 1975, Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue3 followed
the holding of General Motors. In this case, a single resident salesman "held
the market" in Washington for Standard Pressed Steel, which supplied Boeing
Corporation with various kinds of fasteners. Again, although the sales were in-
terstate, the Court found that the in-state activity taxed could be permissibly
measured by the total, unapportioned sales price since the sales were to "a
local consumer" and thus apportioned to the activities.3 4
In 1977, the Court held in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady5 that the
gross receipts at issue were apportioned to the commerce engaged in within the
state. Because those receipts were for transportation services rendered entirely
within Mississippi, no apportionment problem really existed.
Finally, in 1978 the Court held in Department of Revenue v. Association
of Washington Stevedoring Cos.386 that receipts from stevedoring activities car-
ried on within the state were apportioned exactly to those activities. This case
involved facts quite analogous to Complete Auto in that the income was gener-
ated by services performed entirely within the taxing state.
By 1978, then, a clear trend existed at the United States Supreme Court
level to find that gross receipts taxes were self-apportioning in response to
multiple taxation challenges brought by taxpayers.
IV. WESP VIRGINIA B & 0 TAx DECISIONS
The B & 0, Tax decisions to be considered may be categorized by the ac-
tivities taxed: sales of property, sales of services, and contracting. Each cate-
31 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
32 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
33 419 U.S. 560 (1975).
3, Id. at 564.
-430 U.S. 274 (1977).
8 435 U.S. 734 (1978).
[Vol. 85
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gory presents problems which require slightly different analysis under the due
process and commerce clauses. The J.C. Penney trilogy 7 is the primary focus
of the B & 0 Tax discussion. While several cases involving the due process and
commerce clauses were decided after J.C. Penney,38 only Cincinnati Milacron
v. Hardesty9 raised a substantial due process question. An analysis of that
decision will follow comment on the J.C. Penney series.
40
A. Sales of Property
J.C. Penney involved the imposition of tax on gross receipts from sales of
dry-goods and on gross receipts in the form of finance charges. The sales at
issue were direct mail-order sales where the West Virginia customer sent his
order through the mail to an out-of-state catalogue center, and the center sent
the merchandise directly to the customer either through the mail or by inter-
state carrier. The company made two other types of catalogue sales. In the
first, the customer ordered at a local catalogue desk and the merchandise was
sent directly to the customer from out-of-state by mail or common carrier. In
the second type of catalogue sale, the customer ordered by mail through the
local catalogue center and the merchandise was shipped to the local center
where the customer picked it up. Neither of the latter two categories was part
of the controversy.
Income from finance charges was also at issue and arose in association
with the direct out-of-state mail-order sales.4 1 Records of these credit sales
were sent to the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, credit office, the responsibility of
which was to collect the accounts.
The court found a number of minimum contacts between West Virginia
and J.C. Penney to support the jurisdictional nexus, contacts which related to
both the sales and the finance charges. These contacts included J.C. Penney's
use of West Virginia collection agencies, its customers' ability to obtain credit
applications from local J.C. Penney stores, and its customers' option to make
direct mail-order payments to local J.C. Penney stores.
Initially, the majority considered the legal issue to center upon the exis-
tence of those contacts; that is, whether there was a nexus between the com-
pany and West Virginia. That question was thus essentially one of due process.
But a nexus was found almost without discussion. The court further found that
J.C. Penney had not proven multiple taxation; the balance of the commerce
clause test set forth in Complete Auto was held summarily to have been met.42
37 See supra note 3. Sturgeon is omitted since it did not involve the B & 0 Tax but the
Titling Privilege Tax found in W. VA. CODE § 17A-3-4 (Supp. 1982).
See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
39 290 S.E.2d 902 (W. Va. 1982).
40 See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
41 However, the concurring opinion took the view that the dispute was not limited to those
particular finance charges. J.C. Penney, 264 S.E.2d at 616. So far as analysis of this issue is con-
cerned, though, in both the majority and concurring opinions the finance charges were treated as
those arising solely from the direct out-of-state mail-order sales. Id.
42 Id. at 610.
1983]
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The majority opinion left a more detailed and meaningful analysis of the facts
and law to the concurring opinion.
1. Sales
a. General. While the majority opinion made no mention of Norton Co.
v. Department of Revenue, 5 a case factually quite similar to J.C. Penney, the
concurring opinion centered upon it. Justice Miller distinguished Norton on its
facts and noted it apparently had been weakened by subsequent United States
Supreme Court cases.44 Norton involved a Massachusetts company which
maintained a warehouse and branch office in Chicago, Illinois. The company
sold its goods in Illinois in three ways. First, some sales were made at retail
directly through the Chicago branch office. Second, some sales involved at least
some direct contact between the Illinois customer and the Massachusetts com-
pany, but still the orders or shipments were routed through the Chicago office.
The third category involved sales based on orders made directly to Massachu-
setts by Illinois customers where Norton then shipped the goods directly to the
customer.45 These latter sales were the subject of the dispute between the Illi-
nois Department of Revenue and Norton.
The Illinois court held that recepits from all sales to Norton's Illinois cus-
tomers were subject to Illinois' gross receipts tax.46 The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court's decision for all categories except the direct,
out-of-state mail-order sales. The Court found no connection between Norton
and Illinois with regard to those sales. Since the sales were solely interstate,
the Court found them to be protected from Illinois tax by the commerce
clause.
47
The Court decided Norton at a time when, in interstate taxation disputes,
commerce clause issues were more in the forefront than due process issues.
However, the knotty issue in J.C. Penney and the real issue in Norton were
ones of due process.
Certainly the Norton decision would appear to have required the West
Virginia court to sustain J.C. Penney's position on its out-of-state direct mail-
order sales. But the majority must have implicitly considered that Complete
Auto had eroded the Norton teaching. Justice Miller, in his concurring opin-
ion, found explicitly that two cases arising under Washington state's B & 0
43 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
44 In Justice Miller's words:
It can be readily seen that Norton's test, whether there is some local service to support
the state tax on a particular transaction, has been transformed by General Motors and
Standard Pressed Steel into an inquiry as to the extent of the local business of the tax-
payer.. . . Once a substantial local connection is found, then a tax will be upheld if it
bears some reasonable apportionment to the local activity.
J.C. Penney, 264 S.E.2d at 617.
41 Norton, 340 U.S. at 536.
4o Norton Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 405 Ill. 314, 90 N.E.2d 737 (1950), modified, 340 U.S. 534,
modified, 409 ]M. 216, 99 N.E.2d 346 (1951).
"' Norton, 340 U.S. at 539.
[Vol. 85
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Tax, General Motors and Standard Pressed Steel,48 had indeed softened Nor-
ton's requirement of a direct relationship between the particular transaction
generating the income being taxed and the in-state activities supporting that
tax.49 General Motors and Standard Pressed Steel require "an inquiry as to
the extent of the local business of the taxpayer. . .. Once a substantial local
connection is found, then a tax will be upheld if it bears some reasonable ap-
portionment to the local activity."'50
Justice Miller, in his concurring opinion, continues:
The taxpayer cannot escape taxation by attempting to isolate his local ac-
tivities into compartments and by concluding that each compartment must be
viewed separately without regard to the taxpayer's entire activities within the
state. In both General Motors and Standard Pressed Steel the taxpayer's in-
state activities were thought to be sufficient to uphold the tax even though
these activities did not have a substantial direct relationship to the activity
taxed."'
General Motors and Standard Pressed Steel were decided before it was
permissible to impose a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate com-
merce.52 In order to support the tax, it was necessary to find enough connec-
tion between the out-of-state company and the in-state activity to warrant in-
cluding in the tax base receipts from all sales (including those with interstate
elements). Such a finding was required for the tax to survive a commerce
clause challenge. While neither case emphasized the fact, the parts of the opin-
ions dealing with in-state activity under the commerce clause are equally appli-
cable to due process considerations.
The apportionment issue, which has been the focus of commerce clause
concerns in gross receipts tax cases, is just as much a due process problem and
should be addressed in that context: whether a rational relationship exists be-
tween the activity carried on in-state and the income which is the measure of
the amount taxed by the state. In J.C. Penney, commerce clause tests were
employed to find a rational relationship sufficient to satisfy due process essen-
tially in a Norton setting.
After finding an erosion of Norton and hence no current application of it,
the concurring opinion in J.C. Penney sets forth a second basis for determining
that the disputed sales generated receipts taxable in accordance with due pro-
cess. Justice Miller indicated that "the record demonstrates that [J.C. Pen-
ney's] out-of-state direct catalog sales are so closely entwined with its local
presence that any attempt to isolate these sales would do violence to custom-
ary retailing concepts."'53 J.C. Penney had argued that its direct mail-order
sales were isolated from any other activity it carried on in West Virginia."
4" See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
49 See supra note 44.
so Id.
51 J.C. Penney, 264 S.E.2d at 617.
:2 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
63 J.C. Penney, 264 S.E.2d at 617.
" Appellee's Brief at 13-29, J.C. Penney, 264 S.E.2d at 604.
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Justice Miller's comment does not support that isolation concept.
According to the concurrence, perhaps more important than the ability of
direct out-of-state mail-order customers to return merchandise so acquired to
West Virginia stores or have the merchandise repaired at those stores, the very
fact that J.C. Penney operated local stores greatly influenced its volume of di-
rect out-of-state mail-order sales. "The customer receives advertising through
all forms of local media and the local store is a showcase for the catalog mer-
chandise, and provides to its customers the catalog itself. Thus, to contend
that out-of-state catalog sales have no local connection is to ignore business
reality.
'55
This second basis for sustaining the tax is the cleaner and stronger ground.
Not surprisingly, it is the precise rationale put forth by the dissenters in Nor-
ton to sustain the Illinois tax on direct out-of-state mail-order sales. 6 It may
not be too foolish to suggest that both bases are grounded in economic reality.
A factual finding that allegedly isolated interstate activity is, in reality, an in-
tegral part of admitted local activity underlies the legal conclusion that due
process is satisfied. That is, a sufficient relationship exists between the transac-
tion taxed and the taxpayer's activities in West Virginia. Such an analysis
squares J.C. Penney, General Motors, Standard Pressed Steel, and the Nor-
ton dissent except for one particular issue - the question of apportionment.
What should be made of the conclusion reached by the Norton majority
that direct out-of-state mail-order sales can be isolated from in-state activity
and thus are not subject to tax because of their purely interstate character?
Though Norton has never been formally overruled, it would appear to be sub-
stantially weakened by the decisions in General Motors and Standard Pressed
Steel, as well as after the sweeping decision in Complete Auto, despite the
suggestion in Standard Pressed Steel to the contrary.5 7 The J.C. Penney con-
currence certainly relies on the demise of Norton at the West Virginia level.
The "economic reality" reasoning expressed in the Norton dissent and in the
J.C. Penney concurring opinion should prevail today. The commerce clause, so
important in Norton, no longer presents an insurmountable hurdle, particu-
larly after Complete Auto.
b. Apportionment. We have concluded that direct out-of-state mail order
sales are properly the subject of taxation in West Virginia because the taxation
of these sales comports with the commerce clause tests of Complete Auto and
the due process requirement of a business presence. But the rational relation-
ship prong of due process must also be satisfied. The rational relationship re-
5 J.C. Penney, 264 S.E.2d at 617.
" Norton, 340 U.S. at 541 (Clark, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Black and Douglas). The
last paragraph of the dissent states, in part:
In maintaining a local establishment of such magnitude, the petitioner has adopted the
label of a hometown merchant. After it has received the manifold advantages of that
label, we should not give our sanction to its claim made at taxpaying time that with
respect to direct sales it is only an itinerant drummer.
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quired is the relationship between the activities of the taxpayer within the tax-




Sales made by J.C. Penney exclusively through its local stores were sales
consummated entirely in West Virginia. Clearly, receipts from those sales need
not be apportioned to any other state. However, receipts from sales involving
non-West Virginia elements, such as direct out-of-state mail-order sales and
sales of merchandise ordered at a local store but sent directly from an out-of-
state warehouse to the West Virginia customer may have to be isolated and
apportioned to meet the rational relationship requirement of due process. 9 To
whatever extent activities outside West Virginia contribute to effectuating the
two types of interstate sales mentioned, justification exists to apportion those
sales receipts between West Virginia and non-West Virginia activities before
applying the B & 0 Tax. If gross receipts are apportioned, then only West
Virginia activities would attract the West Virginia tax. J.C. Penney would com-
pensate West Virginia for its provision of government services and the benefits
of a civilized society only in some relation to its use of those services in plying
its trade.6 0
General Motors and Standard Pressed Steel would support the proposi-
tion that J.C. Penney's entire gross receipts are subject to West Virginia's
B & 0 Tax because the local business activity bears a fair relation to the in-
come taxed. Though not speaking in terms of a rational relationship, the Court
58 It is interesting to note that the court in every case under discussion found not only that
the threshold business presence existed but also that the tax was self-apportioning. In other words,
so far as the apportionment question was concerned, the court found that the entire tax base was
attributable to West Virginia. That is tantamount to requiring no apportionment whatsoever.
In a case involving a West Virginia taxpayer, Dravo Contracting Co. v. James, 114 F.2d 242
(4th Cir. 1940), the court held that if the statute itself did not call for apportionment and if appor-
tionment were required to comport with constitutional restraints, then the statute would be totally
void and therefore no tax could be imposed. (In fact, this point was argued by Pittsburgh-Des
Moines. Reply Brief of Appellant at 9, J.C. Penney, 264 S.E.2d at 604.) While the Dravo opinion
seems to skirt that particular issue by saying that the activity there involved was one which was
taxable by the state of West Virginia and therefore apportioned, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals may have been concerned that, once having found the required business presence, it
would have to find either that the tax was totally void or that the entire tax base was subject to
the West Virginia tax.
While the B & 0 Tax provisions do not mention apportionment generally, it is permitted in
the production of natural resources and manufacturing if that activity is begun in West Virginia
and completed outside the state. W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2 (2d para.) (1974 & Supp. 1982). However,
B & 0 Tax Reg. § 3.2 provides for apportionment generally, emphasizing apportionment in the
"service" classification, but specifically mentioning also sales and contracting. This regulation was
never referred to by the court in any of the cases under discussion, perhaps because it was not
raised by the parties.
'9 One dissenter in Norton would have held these latter kinds of interstate sales not taxable
by Illinois. 340 U.S. at 541 (Reed, J., dissenting). However, three other Justices concluded that
such sales should be taxable by Illinois. 340 U.S. at 541 (Clark, J., dissenting, joined by Justices
Black and Douglas).
so As Justice Frankfurter put it, "[t]he simple but controlling question is whether the state
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held in Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney that a tax is proper under due process con-
siderations if it is in fair proportion to the taxpayer's activities and enjoyment
and use of protection and opportunity afforded by the state. 1
The strong dissent in General Motors centered upon this precise issue of
what is "fair" recompense for government protection and services.0 2 Apportion-
ment of net income is necessary to attribute to a state an amount of net in-
come rationally related to the taxpayer's activities in that state, from which
amount is extracted a tax which in turn bears a rational relationship to the
opportunities and benefits afforded by the taxing state.6 3 The Wisconsin J.C.
Penney test is satisfied. In an interstate setting, an exact determination of
what a particular taxpayer "owes" a state in return for protection and other
government benefits is almost impossible. The only practical alternatives are
apportionment by formula or specific allocation. Apportionment of interstate
gross receipts would ensure that the gross receipts tax base bears the rational
relationship to in-state activities required by due process.
64
For commerce clause purposes both the United States Supreme Court and
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals have described gross receipts
taxes as self-apportioning because that the activity taxed occurs only within
the state.6 5 Hence, for due process purposes, the tax should bear the requisite
rational relationship to the activity or income taxed. In most instances under
the B & 0 Tax, the self-apportioning description is accurate, but it is sug-
gested here that the description is not accurate with respect to interstate sales
such as direct out-of-state mail-order sales. The activities generating such sales
do not occur only within West Virginia. These activities involve non-West Vir-
ginia elements. 66
c. Penney in Indiana. J.C. Penney took its case to Indiana, a state
which also imposes a gross receipts tax. However, Indiana's tax differs from
West Virginia's in that it is not a tax on the privilege of engaging in business. 7
1 Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. at 444.
62 General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 457 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
63 See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978).
" The Willis Subcommittee Report notes apportionment as one way of resolving the problem.
It also states that apportionment has not, however, been used by the Court. Supra note 20, at
1037-38. Interestingly, the final recommendation of the Subcommittee was to permit only the state
of origin to impose a gross receipts tax, since it had the strongest ties to the business of any
jurisdiction. Id. at 1195-96.
65 See Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734,
746-47 (1978); J.C. Penney, 264 S.E.2d at 619 (Miller, J., concurring).
66 On the other hand, certain services or transportation in interstate commerce may occur
only in West Virginia and properly be subject to an unapportioned gross receipts tax because, in
fact, the tax in that instance is truly self-apportioning. See Department of Revenue v. Association
of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978) (services), and Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (transportation). See also Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Har-
desty, AP-CA-72. 79-89 (Cir. Ct. of Kanawha Cty March 2, 1981), appeal denied, (W. Va. Sept. 29,
1981, Nov. 10, 1981, March 11, 1982), appeal dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 32 (1982).
87 IND. CODE ANN. § 6-2-1-2 (Burns 1978) imposes "a tax upon the receipt of gross income,
measured by the amount or volume of gross income, and in the amount to be determined by such
application of rates on such income. "
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Almost a year after the West Virginia decision in J.C. Penney, Indiana's inter-
mediate appeals court held in favor of the company on both the direct out-of-
state mail-order issue and the finance charge issue."8 The opinion appears to be
nothing more than an interpretation of the Indiana statute itself. While it is
difficult to determine what the court considered critical, clearly the Norton
approach was lurking in the wings. The court cited Mueller Brass,6" an Indiana
case similar to Norton in the sense that certain activity of the taxpayer could
be isolated from its clearly in-state activity. The isolated activity in Mueller
was found to be solely interstate in nature and therefore totally outside the
taxing jurisdiction of Indiana.7 0 In Mueller, nonresident salesmen solicited
sales which were accepted outside Indiana and which were consummated by
interstate shipments directly to the customer inside Indiana. The court held in
J.C. Penney that the company's income from its direct mail-order sales and
finance charges simply did not involve enough in-state contacts to support the
Indiana tax.71 The court never reached the constitutional issues.7 2
d. Application to Mail-Order Business. If the West Virginia court had
deemed it appropriate to treat the direct out-of-state mail-order sales in isola-
tion from the other sales, as did Indiana, would it have held such direct mail-
order sales to be beyond the taxing jurisdiction of the state under due process?
In other words, would the protection for mail-order houses mentioned by Jus-
tice Goldberg, dissenting in General Motors in 1964, 7 still be available today,
or should it be?
One can only speculate. It may be tempting to follow legal precedent with-
out taking into account changing times and theories. But by virtue of holding a
substantial market through a mail-order business, the seller has established a
business presence in that market state in satisfaction of the threshold require-
ment of due process. For, as is true of any other seller, the mail-order seller is
taking full advantage of a civilized society in which to ply its trade. Moreover,
to the extent that government costs are incurred to maintain that civilized so-
ciety, those who benefit from it should share in the cost of supporting it.
The next question concerns the measure of the tax. Clearly there must be
some sort of apportionment to reflect the activity of the seller in the state so
that the out-of-state activity will not be part of the basis for the West Virginia
tax.
Neither General Motors nor Standard Pressed Steel went this far because
the facts in those cases did not force the Court to do so. But the opinions are
based on the concept of "holding the market,' 7 4 as is the West Virginia J.C.
66 Department of State Revenue v. J.C. Penney Co., 412 N.E.2d 1246 (Ind. App. 1980).
6 Mueller Brass Co. v. Department of State Revenue, 255 Ind. 514, 265 N.E.2d 704, appeal
dismissed, 403 U.S. 901 (1971).
70 255 Ind. at 593, 265 N.E.2d at 717.
71 J.C. Penney, 412 N.E.2d at 1251.
71 Id. at 1252.
73 377 U.S. at 462.
74 General Motors, 377 U.S. at 448; Standard Pressed Steel, 419 U.S. at 562.
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Penney opinion.75 Today "holding the market" may be, and often is, accom-
plished without physical presence of offices or persons; however, that technical-
ity should not avoid some tax. Apportionment is the realistic way in which to
recognize a threshold nexus but tax only in-state activities.
The strong dissent in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Reve-
nue"8 took the position that exploiting the market to a substantial degree es-
tablished sufficient nexus for requiring a mall-order house to collect Illinois'
use tax .7  There is no reason why that rationale should not apply to a direct
71 "[tihe activities of the taxpayer are greatly facilitated by its overall operations in West
Virginia. . . ." J.C. Penney, 264 S.E.2d at 610.
76 386 U.S. 753 (1967). Illinois attempted to force National Bellas Hess, an out-of-state mail-
order firm, to collect the Illinois use tax on sales to Illinois residents. According to the majority,
the only connection of any jurisdictional significance which National Bellas Hess had with Illinois
was via the United States mail or common carrier. The majority held that these two contacts with
Illinois were insufficient to establish jurisdiction in Illinois to require use tax collection.
7 After reciting the salient facts reflecting $2,000,000 worth of sales in Illinois, mailings of
substantial numbers of catalogs and fliers and selling on credit, Justice Fortas, joined by Justices
Black and Douglas, wrote:
There should be no doubt that this large-scale, systematic, continuous solicitation
and exploitation of the Illinois consumer market is a sufficient "nexus" to require Bellas
Hess to collect from Illinois customers and to remit the use tax, especially when coupled
with the use of the credit resources of residents of Illinois, dependent as that mechanism
is upon the State's banking and credit institutions. Bellas Hess is not simply using the
facilities of interstate commerce to serve customers in Illinois. It is regularly and contin-
uously engaged in "exploitation of the consumer market" of Illinois (Miller Bros. Co. v.
State of Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 347, 74 S. Ct. 535, 540, 98 L. Ed. 744 (1954)) by solicit-
ing residents of Illinois who live and work there and have homes and banking connec-
tions there, and who, absent the solicitation of Bellas Hess, might buy locally and pay
the sales tax to support their State. Bells Hess could not carry on its business in Illi-
nois, and particularly its substantial credit business, without utilizing Illinois banking
and credit facilities. Since the case was tried on affidavits, we are not informed as to the
details of the company's credit operations in Illinois. We do not know whether it utilizes
credit information or collection agencies, or similar institutions. The company states that
it has "brought no suits in the State of Illinois." Accepting this is true, it would never-
theless be unreasonable to assume that the company does not either sell or assign its
accounts or otherwise take measures to collect its delinquent accounts, or that collection
does not include local activities by the company or it assignees or representatives.
Bellas Hess enjoys the benefits of, and profits from the facilities nurtured by, the
State of Illinois as fully as if it were a retail store or maintained salesmen therein. In-
deed, if it did either, the benefit that it received from the State of Illinois would be no
more than it now has - the ability to make sales of its merchandise, to utilize credit
facilities, and to realize a profit; and, at the same time, it would be required to pay
additional taxes. Under the present arrangement, it conducts its substantial, regular, and
systematic business in Illinois and the State demands only that it collect from its cus-
tomer-users - and remit to the State - the use tax which is merely equal to the sales
tax which resident merchants must collect and remit. To excuse Bells Hess from this
obligation is to burden and penalize retailers located in Illinois who must collect the
sales tax from their customers. In Illinois the rate is 3 1/2 %, and when it is realized that
in some communities the sales tax requires, in effect, that as much as 5% be added to
the amount that customers of local, tax-paying stores must pay, the importance of the
competitive discrimination becomes apparent. While this advantage to out-of-state sell-
ers is tolerable and a necessary constitutional consequence where the sales are occa-
sional, minor and sporadic and not the result of a calculated, systematic exploitation of
the market, it certainly should not be extended to instances where the out-of-state com-
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tax (imposition of tax on taxpayer as opposed to only a collection requirement
on taxpayer) in spite of the traditional distinction between the nexus require-
ment for direct taxation and only a collection responsibility.78
2. Finance Charges
a. Penney in West Virginia. The facts surrounding this issue were set forth
earlier along with the facts relating to the sales issue.79 West Virginia taxed
J.C. Penney's gross receipts from finance charges which the company collected
on credit sales in West Virginia."0 The majority opinion lumped the sales and
finance charges issues together and concluded with little discussion that they
were all subject to the B & 0 Tax. As in the case of the sales controversy, we
must look to Justice Miller's concurring opinion for any analysis.
According to that opinion, sufficient nexus existed to tax the finance
charges on direct out-of-state mail-order sales. "[O]nce its substantial local
presence is established, Penney is subject to a fairly apportioned tax on all of
its activities within the state, regardless of whether a particular aspect, in iso-
lation, may have fewer local connections." ' It is difficult to tell whether Jus-
tice Miller found the required nexus because the finance charges arose out of
the sales and therefore were inextricably tied up with them, or whether the
finance charges were viewed in isolation and had their own set of connections
to West Virginia. 2 The latter appears to be the case even though language in
his opinion appears to the contrary.83 One might wonder whether the court
may, in future cases, isolate various activities to determine whether those ac-
tivities themselves are of such a nature as to permit West Virginia to tax them
in accordance with due process requirements. While neither the majority nor
concurring opinion is clear in this regard, the tenor of J.C. Penney leads one to
believe that no such isolation would be part of the court's analysis.
The key to Justice Miller's reasoning is that the tax is by nature appor-
tioned in accordance with activities carried on in West Virginia. The opinion
dogmatically follows the General Motors and Standard Pressed Steel general-
ization that B & 0 Taxes are self-apportioning because the activity taxed oc-
pany is engaged in exploiting the local market on a regular, systematic, large-scale basis.
In such cases, the difference between the nature of the business conducted by the mail
order house and by the local enterprise is not entitled to constitutional significance.
386 U.S. 753 at 761-63.
78 See National Geographic Soc'y v. State Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 556-58 (1977).
However, the Court in National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753, noted the fact that, under the Illi-
nois statute, National Bellas Hess was liable for the use tax whether or not it collected the tax,
essentially a direct liability. Id. at 757 n.9.
79 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
80 J.C. Penney, 264 S.E.2d at 609. Even though the finance charges were taxed under the
"service" classification (W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2h (1974)), this issue will be discussed here because it
arose out of the sales of property. The next section of this article will deal more generally with the
due process and commerce clause problems which the "service" classification raises.
81 J.C. Penney, 264 S.E.2d at 618.
82 Id. at 618. After the broad statement (cited supra note 81) Justice Miller set out in two
paragraphs the West Virginia elements of the finance charges.
83 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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curs only within the taxing state."4 This view is an oversimplification. The fact
is that the finance charges had both in-state and out-of-state elements, just as
the sales themselves had. By not according any weight to the out-of-state ele-
ments through specifically allocating or apportioning gross receipts, the deci-
sion in this case permits West Virginia to attribute to itself some income which
relates to activities carried on outside the state. That position violates due pro-
cess. Although there is not the slightest doubt that the first prong of due pro-
cess, jurisdictional nexus, was satisfied with respect to the finance charges, the
second prong, the rational relationship between the income taxed and the ac-
tivities generating that income, requires part of the finance charges to be at-
tributed to activity out of West Virginia. Income from that out-of-state activity
cannot be taxed here.
b. Penney in Indiana. J.C. Penney, as noted above in connection with
the sales issue, brought a similar case in Indiana.8 5 The intermediate Indiana
appellate court held that the finance charges were not subject to the Indiana
gross receipts tax because they were intangibles which had not obtained a situs
within Indiana. Since Penney was a non-resident of Indiana, such intangibles
were not subject to the Indiana tax."6 As in the case of the mail-order sales,
this part of the opinion is based more on statutory construction than constitu-
tional analysis and so is of limited value here.
87
c. Penney in Washington. Nearly two years after the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals had decided J.C. Penney, the Supreme Court of
Washington decided a Penney case on the finance charge issue.88 It reached a
middle ground.
The court in Washington found that not all activities giving rise to the
finance charges occurred in Washington but that some of those activities took
place in Oregon. Apparently the finance charges in this case did not involve
finance charges to direct out-of-state mail-order sales.8 9 The bulk of the opin-
ion recited the activities that underlie the finance charge income and listed the
situs of those activities. The court found that all Penney's activities related to
credit sales gave rise to finance charge income.90
The activities which took place outside Washington included credit ap-
proval, billing and bookkeeping. These elements of credit sales were handled in
Portland, Oregon.9 1 The activities which took place within Washington in-
cluded the underlying sales at Washington stores, in-state employee assistance
with the application for credit privileges, credit approval by Washington em-
" J.C. Penney, 264 S.E.2d at 618-19.
" J.C. Penney, 412 N.E.2d at 1246.
88 Id. at 1251.
87 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
88 State Dep't of Revenue v. J.C. Penney Co., 96 Wash. 2d 38, 633 P.2d 870 (1981). The un-
derlying sales were not in issue. For a very recent, short note on this point, see Piper, Gross Re-
ceipts Taxes Applied to Credit Financing, 2 INTErsTAT TAX REP'T 14 (1982).
89 96 Wash. 2d at 44, 633 P.2d at 874.
90 Id.
9' Id. at 40, 633 P.2d at 871-72.
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ployees reversing the initial Portland office decision not to grant credit, pay-
ment on some credit accounts directly to Washington stores, and use of Wash-
ington collection companies. The Washington usury laws were also applicable,
and the Washington courts provided the forum for enforcement of collection
matters.92
The court affirmed the Norton teaching that activities must be tested in
isolation to determine if the gross receipts which they produce are taxable.9 3
The court found due process nexus and the due process rational relationship,
but it required apportionment in order to meet that second prong, which the
state had conceded was proper.9 The court remanded on the apportionment
issue, citing the West Virginia J.C. Penney case with approval and dismissing
the Indiana J.C. Penney controversy as being only a case of statutory
interpretation.
9 5
Justice Dolliver wrote a rather strong dissent 6 based upon a discussion of
Rena-Ware Distributing, Inc. v. State" which he believed, as did Penney, was
the "mirror image" of Penney's situation. Essentially the dissent found, based
upon Rena-Ware, that all the activities giving rise to the finance charges took
place in Portland, Oregon. Therefore, Washington had no jurisdiction to tax
them in the first place. 8
The approach of the majority seems to square more with economic reality.
The activities generating the finance charges had interstate elements. The
nexus to tax was clear, and the rational relationship between the activity and
the income taxed could be met here only through apportionment.
d. The West Virginia Solution. As in the case of mail-order sales, the
choices are three. West Virginia could tax the finance charges completely, not
at all, or partially. The last alternative appears to be the fairest and least of-
fensive. The fact that the Washington case did not involve direct out-of-state
mail-order sales should not in any way lessen its applicability to the finance
charges which were the subject of the West Virginia litigation. The principle
established in the Washington Penney case should be applicable to finance
charges arising from any kind of sale.
B. Services
In Richardson, Gordon and Associates v. Hardesty,9" an engineering part-
nership operating out of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, entered into various con-
92 Id. at 44, 633 P.2d at 874.
, Id. at 47, 633 P.2d at 875.
Id. at 48, 633 P.2d at 876. Probably the state conceded that apportionment was proper
because the Washington B & 0 Tax law contains an apportionment provision dealing with the
"service" classification. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.04.460 (1981). Washington's statute is quite
similar to West Virginia's B & 0 Tax Reg. § 3.2 referred to in supra note 58.
9 96 Wash. 2d at 46-47, 633 P.2d at 876.
Id. at 49, 633 P.2d at 876.
97 77 Wash. 2d 514, 463 P.2d 622 (1970).
98 J.C. Penney, 96 Wash. 2d at 55, 633 P.2d at 879.
" 264 S.E.2d 604 (W. Va. 1980).
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tracts with the West Virginia Department of Highways, pursuant to which the
firm performed services and received payment of professional fees therefore.
The taxpayer contended that only 5% of the services rendered took place in
West Virginia; hence only that percentage of its fees should be subject to the B
& 0 Tax. The court concluded that 100% of the fees was subject to the tax. 00
The firm produced engineering drawings and reports. It would survey a
proposed highway route from aerial photographs, prepare a location report on
the route, and later draft final engineering plans once the route had been se-
lected by the Highway Department. Each one of these activities took place in
Pittsburgh. 10 '
In West Virginia, the firm would retain a sub-contractor to bore holes,
send in a survey team to site the holes and supervise the boring, occasionally
make a field inspection of a project, send in personnel to determine number
and location of property owners on the route, and attend community meetings
and other meetings in Charleston. It also established a branch office in Wheel-
ing. 02 While 5 % may have been a low estimate of the percentage of total ser-
vices performed in West Virginia, it is clear that "[tihe bulk of all the work,
however, was performed in Pittsburgh .... ,,1o3
The court found "sufficient contacts to meet the [general jurisdictional
nexus] requirements of Standard Pressed Steel and National Geo-
graphic .. ."0" The court then recognized that the major issue was "one of
apportionment and fair relationship to the services rendered by the State of
West Virginia."' 0 5 Unfortunately, the analysis which followed limited itself to
commerce clause considerations. The court noted that the taxpayer had not
proven multiple taxation. It allowed the entire service income to be subjected
to West Virginia's B & 0 Tax. Though the court recognized the need for ap-
portionment in many cases, it seemed to rely on the fact that, in a number of
sales-of-property cases, the question is resolved by permitting the destination
state to tax the entire sales price. Concomitantly, the state of manufacture
100 Id. at 612. The court reached this decision without mention of B & 0 Tax Reg. § 3.2
dealing with apportionment. See supra notes 58 and 94.
101 Richardson, Gordon, 264 S.E.2d at 611.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. National Geographic, 430 U.S. at 551, is a use tax collection case cited by Justice Neely
in the main body of the opinion. The United States Supreme Court upheld California's position,
finding sufficient contact between the out-of-state taxpayer magazine and the State to impose the
burden of collecting the use tax from California residents who purchased maps, atlases, globes and
books from National Geographic's District of Columbia mail-order business.
105 Richardson, Gordon, 264 S.E.2d at 611. While apportionment can, and does, involve due
process, language is taken from Complete Auto which set forth commerce clause standards except
for the reference to nexus generally. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274
(1977). Apportionment there had to do with the avoidance of multiple taxation; the relationship to
services involved the challenge that a business in interstate commerce might pay more tax than a
solely intrastate business compared to the services each receives from the taxing state. Cf. Com-
monwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 620-29 (1981), which emasculated this part of the
Complete Auto test, discussed further infra note 152.
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would forego taxation of any part of the sales price.'°6
The concurring opinion offers more analysis. As in Penney when Justice
Miller determined that Norton had been undermined by General Motors and
Standard Pressed Steel, the concurrence relied on the same two cases to dis-
tinguish Baton Coal Co. v. Battle,' an older West Virginia case factually simi-
lar to Richardson, Gordon, and to find that the business presence test had
been enlarged. Even though the value of the activities giving rise to the income
was meager, the income itself was substantial and could be fully taxed because
those "receipts [were] derived from the local transaction."108
The majority and concurring opinions both appear to misapply or pass
over the rational relationship required by due process. So do General Motors
and Standard Pressed Steel.10 9 Once having found jurisdictional nexus, the
opinions fail to take into account the out-of-state elements of the sales or ser-
vices, even though out-of-state activities gave rise to some of the tax base.
Those out-of-state activities would always be taken into consideration under a
net income tax, yet in gross receipts tax cases, the courts have taken an all-or-
nothing approach - ignoring the fact that only apportionment of some kind will
reach the most reasonable result in our current sophisticated economy. "Local"
transactions simply did not give rise to all the receipts taxed.
The West Virginia court inappropriately used sales-of-goods cases (Gen-
eral Motors and Standard Pressed Steel) to support the taxation of income
from services. In General Motors and Standard Pressed Steel, wholly local
activities of various personnel established the taxing jurisdiction. Those local
activities resulted in sales, the receipts from which were taxed. The fact that
the sales were clearly interstate seems to have been forgotten; the wholly local
activities of certain personnel brought the entire interstate sales price under
the tax which seems to violate the rational relationship requirement of due
1 Richardson, Gordon, 264 S.E.2d at 612.
107 151 W. Va. 519, 153 S.E.2d 522 (1967).
In Baton a Pittsburgh mining consulting firm provided managerial services to a West Virginia
coal mining company. Testimony indicated that about 15% of the working days of some of Baton's
employees was spent in West Virginia. Also, a very small portion of the managerial services re-
sulted from the time spent in West Virginia by those employees. But for these forays into West
Virginia, all other services were performed in Pittsburgh. The fact that Baton had its principal
place of business and offices outside of West Virginia, however, was not the ground for holding the
company not liable for the B & 0 Tax. The court decided "that, in view of the comparatively
meager business activity of Baton within West Virginia in the tax years in question, performed
incidentally to the business in which it was engaged in Pennsylvania, Baton was not engaging in a
service business or calling 'within this State'. . . ." Id. at 525, 153 S.E.2d at 526.
208 Richardson, Gordon, 264 S.E.2d at 622.
What Justice Miller seems to be saying is that while the in-state activity itself (the subject of
the tax) may not be particularly valuable, the income to which it gives rise (the measure of the tax)
can be of a much higher value and be fully taxed. While this may be somewhat true of a sales
situation where the activity of a single salesman gives rise to a substantial amount of income from
the sales which are completed because of his activity, this theory is inapplicable to services. Ser-
vices are too directly related to the receipts generated to have the same kind of effect which might
arise out of the relationship between the activity of the salesman and the subsequent sale.
109 General Motors, 377 U.S. 436, 449-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also J. HELLERSTEIN &
W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LocAL TAXATION 301-03 (4th ed. 1978), agreeing with this dissent.
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process. Unlike cases where goods are sold, services involve activities which
themselves generate the tax base. For example, professional fees, generated di-
rectly by the services rendered, are the tax base in the instant case. It would
appear relatively easy to determine the situs of any particular personal service
and allocate the income generated by it to the particular state in which the
service took place. Sales-of-goods cases present a much more difficult task of
apportionment or allocation.
Cases dealing with gross receipts taxes and services in interstate commerce
settings indeed exist.110 In both Complete Auto and Washington Stevedoring,
the service income arose from activities which took place entirely within the
taxing jurisdiction albeit as part of interstate commerce."1 The receipts in
Complete Auto arose from transportation services occurring entirely within
Mississippi.1 2 The receipts in Washington Stevedoring arose from stevedoring
services performed within the State of Washington. 1 3 No apportionment was
necessary. The clear implication in both of these cases is that apportionment
would have been required had the receipts at issue been attributable to ser-
vices performed outside the taxing state.
The West Virginia court appears to have ignored economic reality and
misconstrued and misapplied General Motors and Standard Pressed Steel in
Richardson, Gordon & Associates, permitting West Virginia to tax gross re-
ceipts generated partly by activities which bore no rational relationship to the
State of West Virginia, clearly in violation of due process.
C. Contracting
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Goodwin 1 4 involved a corporation
which designed and fabricated large steel structures in Pennsylvania. These
structures were then brought into West Virginia in pieces because of their size
and weight. Once in West Virginia, the structures were erected by the tax-
payer, usually as elevated water storage tanks and flat bottom storage tanks.
West Virginia imposed its B & 0 Tax on the entire contract price despite the
out-of-state design and fabrication. The court upheld the tax."'
The court found that Pittsburgh-Des Moines had established a presence in
West Virginia sufficient to warrant its being liable to B & 0 Tax. While the
taxpayer had no office, warehouse or plant in West Virginia, it was clearly car-
rying on its business of erecting large steel structures in the state. It also in-
spected the tanks after erection and determined site selection and foundation
design. Certainly Pittsurgh-Des Moines had established a business presence
110 Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 734; Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 274.
" Complete Auto involved a tax similar to West Virginia's Carrier Income Tax discussed
later in this article.
" 430 U.S. at 276.
113 435 U.S. at 750. The Court said: "Nor have respondents successfully attacked the appor-
tionment of the Washington system. The tax under challenge was levied solely on the value of the
loading and unloading that occurred in Washington." Id.
,14 264 S.E.2d 604 (1979).
Ill Id. at 611.
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based upon these facts which should, and did, attract the B & 0 Tax." 6 How-
ever, whether the entire contract price should have been subjected to the tax is
questionable.
The majority found that the requisite nexus arose out of the West Virginia
contacts above noted and upheld the tax on the entire contract price because
all construction in West Virginia involves the assembling of parts manufac-
tured outside of the State of West Virginia. While the prefabrication of a stor-
age tank out-of-state to be assembled in West Virginia is a spectacular exam-
ple of out-of-state parts being assembled by a contractor, nonetheless, most of
the toilets, hardware, kitchen equipment, carpet, windows, and heating systems
installed in buildings constructed in West Virginia have been manufactured
elsewhere.
117
The court intended that this comparison support the state's subjecting the en-
tire contract price to the tax rather than only the part of the contract price
which actually related to West Virginia activities, that part being erection
activities.
Again the court seems to have incorrectly construed the requirement that
a rational relationship exist between activities carried on within the state and
the income taxed. On the assumption that the contract contemplated payment
for design and fabrication, as well as for erection of the tank, logic would sug-
gest that part of the contract price should be attributed to design and
fabrication. Surely the taxpayer contemplated such payment in negotiating the
contract. Then, if "contracting" is limited to "erection,"" 8s only the price at-
tributable to putting together the tank and the other incidental West Virginia
activities should constitute the base for the tax. Design and fabrication clearly
occurred outside the state of West Virginia.
The majority's comparison of this taxpayer to a building contractor who
performs his contract with hardware made outside West Virginia is misleading.
Presumably, the point of the comparison was to suggest that the taxpayer had
been paid the entire contract price only for erecting a water tank in West Vir-
ginia and where or how it acquired the materials to perform the contract was
immaterial. Moreover, since the "erecting" took place here, the entire contract
price was taxable. That reasoning is superficially attractive. But here the tax-
payer itself designed and manufactured the materials which it later erected.
That fact alone nullifies the validity of the court's suggestion.
A building contractor who agrees to erect a building for $100,000.00, which
116 Id. at 610-11.
117 Id.
118 See Koppers Co. v. Dailey, 280 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1981), which held that certain activity
constituted "contracting" and not "services." Koppers involved building coke ovens for Weirton
Steel, among other things. There were three contracts: one for the cost of material, one for the cost
of erection, and one for the cost of engineering. The lower court treated all three contracts as one.
The finding was not disputed by the taxpayer.
Koppers installed precipitators to remove fly ash for Ohio Power. Some of the components of
the precipitators were fabricated out of state. Whether this fabrication was unconstitutionally
made part of the tax base was not in issue.
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price includes the cost and installation of toilets and other hardware, is indeed
paid for the gathering of the materials and putting them all together as the
final building. In that case, the entire $100,000.00 should be subject to tax
under the "contracting" category. If the building is built in West Virginia, then
the entire $100,000.00 is subject to West Virginia's taxing jurisdiction. On the
other hand, if the contractor (the erector) fabricates or manufactures some of
the materials to be erected, and if the parties to the contract contemplate that
the total price is attributable in part to erection, in part to design, and in part
to fabrication, it cannot be said the full price is paid for erection. Fabricators
are both manufacturers and contractors. How to tax them has always been a
troublesome question, particularly where state tax statutes have separate cate-
gories as does the B & 0 Tax119 and the Sales and Use Tax.120 Pittsburgh was
paid for several different activities. To the extent that some of these activities
took place in Pennsylvania, they should not attract the West Virginia tax. No
rational relationship exists between those activities and the income taxed so
far as West Virginia is concerned. Hence, the imposition of tax violates the
requirements of due process.
The concurring opinion, however, lends some substantial support to the
majority. It relies upon Dravo Contracting Co. v. James1 21 which held, in the
case of a dam contractor, that certain fabricated materials made in Penn-
sylvania would not escape the West Virginia B & 0 Tax "if they were used in
the performance of the contract in West Virginia and payments made the con-
tractor were dependent upon such use. 1 1 22 Apparently this is the general
rule. 123 But the statute at the time of Dravo was not as specific as it is today.
Today, the definition of "contracting" includes the erection or construction of
real property. If the difference in definition is at all limiting, then arguably
Pittsburgh can be distinguished. However, one might counter just as forcefully
that no significant change has been made; hence, the tax was properly applied
"0 Compare W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2b (Supp. 1982) (manufacturing) with W. VA. CODE § 11-13-
2c (1974) (contracting). See also West Virginia State Tax Dep't Administrative Decision 82-19-B
dealing with the manufacturing and service categories under the B & 0 Tax.
20 W. VA. CODE § 11-15-1 (1974) and § 11-15A-1 (1974). The problem under a sales and use
tax is whether the person is a contractor who is the consumer and thus taxable, or one who merely
provides services in performing a contract. Another difficulty is the distinction between a manufac-
turer who allegedly sells at retail (no sales tax on his purchases) and a fabricator who makes cus-
tom pieces and then installs them. Is the latter a "contractor," subject to sales tax on his
purchases, or a retailer (no tax on his purchases) selling products with a separate charge for
installation?
Sales of computer software raise a similar issue, that is, whether tangible personal property is
manufactured and sold as such or whether merely services are being provided which result in tan-
gible personal property. Several states take the position that the sale of canned programs are taxa-
ble sales of tangible personal property while the sale of specially designed custom programs consti-
tute non-taxable sales of services. See Note, Sales and Use Tax of Computer Software - Is
Software Tangible Personal Property? 27 WAYNE L. REv. 1503 (1981); Politi, Babiarz & Ferrante,
Sales Taxation of Computer Software and Hardware: A Massachusetts Perspective, 1 J. ST.
TAX'N 329 (1983).
12. 114 F.2d 242 (4th Cir. 1940).
22 Id. at 246. This position is reflected in B & 0 Tax Reg. § 3.2. See supra note 58.
123 See cases cited for this proposition at 264 S.E.2d 604, 620 (W. Va. 1979).
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against the entire contract price even though the result seems wrong from the
due process point of view. 2"
The validity of the taxation of the Pittsburgh firm was premised on the
assumption that the activity being taxed occurred entirely within West Vir-
ginia, namely, the erection of fabricated materials. Thus, since the activity was
deemed to have taken place solely in West Virginia, no need for apportionment
existed. Apportionment was automatic. While taxation based upon the entire
contract price does not seem fair or proper, the concurring justice certainly had
precedent upon which to base his decision.
D. B & 0 Decisions Following the Penney Trilogy
After the Penney trilogy, only one West Virginia case prompted any sig-
nificant analysis of either the due process or commerce clauses. That case is
Cincinnati Milacron Co. v. Hardesty."25 Several other cases touched on those
clauses, but not to any great degree nor on facts of any general application.
They are Newell Bridge and Railway Co. v. Dailey,' 6 Bishop Coal Co. v. Dai-
ley, 127 and Capitol Cablevision Corp. v. Hardesty.812
Milacron involved another sales-of-property question under the B & 0
Tax. Two divisions of an Ohio company sent nonresident regional salesmen
into West Virginia. The salesman from the Machine Tool Division spent 45%
of his time here and obtained about 45% of his total sales receipts from West
Virginia sales. He would discuss and recommend tools. If his company had no
appropriate tools, he would have the Cincinnati shop design and make them.
The Cincinnati home office decided whether to accept or reject West Virginia
orders. The customer normally visited the factory and checked the machine,
124 Had all the activities in Pittsburgh-Des Moines taken place in West Virginia, that is, the
fabricating and designing as well as the erection of the tanks, the State Tax Department would
categorize all activities as "contracting." See Armstrong Inc. v. Hardesty, CA 78-C-256 (Cir. Ct. of
Randolph County, 1979). Hence, there would appear to be no discrimination between the out-of-
state contractor and the in-state contractor, insofar as classification is concerned.
However, the apportionment regulation (B & 0 Tax Reg. § 3.2) indicates the contrary where
fabrication occurs in West Virginia for out-of-state construction. In that case, the fabrication
would be taxed in the manufacturing category according to the regulation. Still, the question
whether West Virginia has the power to tax activities occurring outside the state is not resolved.
12 290 S.E.2d 902 (W. Va. 1982).
126 266 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 942 (1981). In this case the taxpayer
was assessed B & 0 Tax on gross receipts derived from operation of a toll bridge spanning the
Ohio River and connecting Newell, West Virginia with E. Liverpool, Ohio. The court held that
operation of the bridge was not "interstate commerce" and was thus not exempted from state
taxation.
127 276 S.E.2d 220 (W. Va. 1981). The taxpayer's mine extended across state lines. The tax-
payer severed coal in Virginia, but cleaned and tippled it in West Virginia. The court held Bishop
Coal Co. subject to the B & 0 Tax in the manufacturing category on its total gross receipts from
the sale of coal. The court did not allow any apportionment of gross receipts for activities which
took place in Virginia.
128 285 S.E.2d 412 (W. Va. 1981). Here the court held a cable television system subject to the
B & 0 Tax on its gross receipts derived from business in West Virginia. Although the court recog-
nized the system to be an integral part of interstate commerce, it reasoned that the company's
income came from activities conducted wholly within the borders of the state.
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then the machine would be shipped by Milacron and installed by the customer.
After installation, a sales engineer would field-check the equipment. If any
problems arose, a service representative would be sent to the site to correct the
problem. The Products Division operated in the same fashion as the Machine
Tool Division, but three of its salesmen spent only 3% of their time in West
Virginia, where they made 5% of their total sales.
The court had no difficulty finding a taxable presence in West Virginia
with respect to both the sales receipts and service receipts. The court cited
General Motors and Standard Pressed Steel to support the nexus occasioned
by the Products Division salesmen but set forth little analysis. The gist of the
opinion is that Milacron was plying its trade in West Virginia and holding a
market by virtue of the presence of its salesmen, hence, the taxable presence
which forms the threshold nexus requirement under due process. 129
The court discussed the apportionment issue only long enough to charac-
terize the tax as "self-apportioned."' 30 But just as it failed to do in J.C. Pen-
ney, the court did not address the rational relationship requirement ade-
quately. The discussion would have been appropriate since the case concerned
interstate sales, the proceeds from which probably should have been appor-
tioned to satisfy the rational relationship requirement of due process. After all,
both in-state and out-of-state activities gave rise to the sales receipts. The ser-
vice receipts clearly should be subject to the B & 0 Tax in their entirety be-
cause the services were performed in West Virginia.
Despite its failure to adequately attend to the rational relationship re-
quirement of due process, the court in Milacron touched on an interesting as-
pect of the threshold requirement of a business presence.
Courts traditionally have held that mere solicitation does not establish a
sufficient connection between the out-of-state seller of goods and the state of
destination to support a gross receipts tax.13 ' Nonetheless, in Milacron, the
129 Milacron, 290 S.E.2d at 903-04.
130 Id. at 904.
131 See McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
In Mueller Brass, 255 Ind. 514, 265 N.E.2d 704 (1971), sales which were solicited by out-of-
state salesmen, as opposed to sales which were connected with in-state offices, were held not sub-
ject to Indiana's gross receipts tax on the theory that the in-state activity in those instances was
insufficient to take such sales out of the interstate sales category. So long as the sales were charac-
terized as being interstate, they were not subject to taxation by the state because to do so would
violate the commerce clause. The main concern of cases like Mueller is the commerce clause, al-
though it appears that the courts inadvertently slip into due process analysis even though the
actual holding is based squarely and only on the commerce clause.
For an earlier Indiana case similar to Mueller and holding the same way, see Department of
State Revenue v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 263 Ind. 102, 251 N.E.2d 818 (1969). See also
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. State, 38 Wash. 2d 663, 231 P.2d 325 (1951), which followed Norton and is
similar to Mueller and Owens-Coming. The Goodrich decision immediately followed Norton. Nor-
ton was handed down after the argument in Goodrich but before the Washington court had
reached its decision. These cases rested largely on commerce clause considerations, as did Norton.
But see Reynolds Metal Co. v. Indiana Department of State Revenue, 433 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. App.
1982); Indiana Department of State Revenue v. General Foods Corp., 427 N.E.2d 665 (Ind. App.
1981). In General Motors and Standard Pressed Steel, the United States Supreme Court found
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West Virginia court took a position based on economic reality. The court's pre-
mise was that if a taxpayer generates income through activities in West Vir-
ginia, whatever those activities are, it has a business presence here sufficient to
satisfy due process. Businesses must pay a price for carrying on a business in
West Virginia; namely, paying their share of the cost of the government which
permits their activities to be carried on freely.
The question that must be focused upon more clearly is how much of the
income generated by any activity should be attributed to the state as the base
from which that liability is discharged. For if the business presence test is ex-
panding, 132 then the rational relationship requirement becomes commensu-
rately more important as the only real due process limitation.
V. CARRIER INCOME TAX DECISIONS'
The court decided three cases through one opinion dealing with the appli-
cation of the Carrier Income Tax.13 This tax is a gross receipts tax on receipts
arising from transportation and telephone and telegraph activities between
points in West Virginia. 134 Where the activities are interstate, an additional tax
such substantial in-state activity that it associated sales with that activity and found all sales to be
taxable in their entirety, in spite of Norton and without any apportionment.
When Complete Auto put to rest the notion that activities which constituted solely interstate
commerce could not be taxed by the states, the Mueller and Norton line of cases lost a good deal
of force. For if a threshold nexus exists, the fact that the transaction is an interstate sale is not
alone enough to avoid state taxation. So long as the Complete Auto standards are met, a tax on
the sale should withstand a commerce clause challenge.
In the Mueller-type of situation either the "isolated" sales activities are not, in fact, isolated
from the other activities of the taxpayer; or, if they are isolated, they themselves establish a suffi-
cient threshold due process nexus. With the interstate commerce immunity clearly dismantled af-
ter Complete Auto (and perhaps before in Western Live Stock, General Motors, and Standard
Pressed Steel) Mueller-type sales should be subject to state taxation. The only remaining difficulty
is the problem of apportionment to meet the rational relationship requirement of due process.
Of course, in the case of a net income tax, or a tax measured by net income, if the only activity
of the out-of-state business is merely solicitation, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959) codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1976), prohibits the host state from imposing its tax on such out-
of-state business. For a recent case giving a broad interpretation to "solicitation," see U.S. To-
bacco Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 478 Pa. 125, 386 A.2d 471 (1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 880 (1978).
1S2 In his dissent in Cincinnati Milacron, Justice McHugh observed that "[tihere has been a
steady erosion in the [threshold] nexus required." 290 S.E.2d 902, 905 (W. Va. 1982). Rather than
view this requirement as being eroded, it is suggested that threshold nexus has expanded as our
economy and business have become more sophisticated. Two cases involving Mueller-type situa-
tions and the question of threshold nexus are presently before the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, Circuit Court of Kanawha County, Civ. Action No. AP-CA-78-8
(1980), and Williams and Co., Inc. v. Dailey, Circuit Court of Kanawha County, Civ. Action No.
AP-CA-76-100 (1981). Both cases were argued on January 11, 1983.
133 Western Md. Ry. v. Goodwin, 282 S.E.2d 240 (W. Va. 1981), appeal dismissed, 102 S. Ct.
2025 (1982). The other cases decided in the opinion were West Va. Motor Delivery Co. v. Goodwin
and Union Barge Line v. Hardesty. Both Western Maryland and Union Barge appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, but the appeal was dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question.
134 W. VA. CODE § 11-12A-2 (1974 & Supp. 1982).
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is imposed on net income apportioned to West Virginia on a mileage basis.'35
When net income is determined, an adjustment is made if tax is due under the
gross income provision.138 Of the three cases decided together, only the third
raised significant constitutional questions. Nevertheless the first two involved
issues worthy of note.
A. Western Maryland
In Western Maryland Railway Co. v. Goodwin, the major issue was
whether receipts from demurrage 137 arising from railroad cars in West Virginia
as well as receipts from switching railroad cars in West Virginia should be
taxed under the gross income provision or the apportioned net income provi-
sion. The taxpayer, Western Maryland, argued that if the receipts arose from
interstate commerce, only the net income from those activities should be taxed.
Western Maryland treated the revenues from these activities as being from
interstate commerce whenever the railroad cars involved had either begun
their movement or ended it outside West Virginia. But if the origin and desti-
nation of the cars were both in West Virginia, the taxpayer included those
demurrage and switching charges in the gross income portion of the Carrier
Income Tax.
The court held that demurrage for undue retention of cars in West Vir-
ginia constituted business beginning and ending in this state, regardless of the
ultimate origin or destination of the cars. Thus the court rejected the tax-
payer's argument that a two-point West Virginia activity which is part of inter-
state commerce must be taxed under the net income provision. The demurrage
was therefore subject to the gross income part of the tax."" The court also held
that switching is a local activity and deemed it business beginning and ending
in West Virginia. Hence, all West Virginia switching charges were held subject
to the tax on gross income.
3 9
The court easily disposed of the constitutional issues. Nexus obviously was
present. No multiple taxation could exist, said the court, because the activities
taxed took place only in West Virginia.'" Since the activities attracting the tax
took place solely within West Virginia, the rational relationship required by
due process also was met, although the court did not specifically address this
135 W. VA. CODE § 11-12A-3 (1974 & Supp. 1982).
136 W. VA. CODE § 11-12A-3(g) (1974) provides:
(g) In computing the tax imposed by this section, the total net income of a taxpayer
who shall have been taxed under the preceding section [§ 11-12A-2] shall be reduced by
an amount bearing the proportion to such total net income that the gross income of the
taxpayer which is the measure of the tax under the preceding section [§ 11-12A-2] bears
to its total gross income from all business done wherever conducted. No county, city,
town, village or other political subdivision of the State shall levy a license, net income or
any other kind of tax on the business taxed under this article.
M Demurrage is the charge made for retention of the railroad car beyond the scheduled de-
parture date because of loading or unloading.
'" Western Md., 282 S.E.2d at 247.
:39 Id.
14 Id. at 247-48.
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aspect of due process. Thus, where the activity takes place entirely within the
state, as in Complete Auto and Stevedoring, the tax is self-apportioning even
though the activity is a part of interstate commerce.""
B. Motor Delivery
West Virginia Motor Delivery Co. v. Goodwin, 42 the second case decided
of the three, involved a factual pattern similar to that in Complete Auto. 43
West Virginia Motor delivered refrigerated meat by truck. It received ship-
ments at its West Virginia warehouse from out-of-state packers. Then the com-
pany either transferred the meat to its own trucks or stored the meat overnight
in its warehouse. West Virginia Motor then delivered the meat to both in-state
and out-of-state customers. Eighty-eight percent of its business was attributa-
ble to in-state delivery.
The taxpayer took the position that its business was part of a continuous
interstate shipment of goods and paid tax only on a net income basis. The
court agreed that the taxpayer was involved in interstate business, but it held
that the receipts from its deliveries to West Virginia customers were from ac-
tivity conducted from points entirely within West Virginia and were subject to
the gross receipts portion of the tax.'4 With respect to eighty-eight percent of
its business, West Virginia Motor was paid for transporting meat from one
point in West Virginia to another point in West Virginia. The fact that the
transportation occurred in an interstate setting was not material.
As far as due process is concerned, this case deserves the same comments
as Western Maryland. The business presence was clear. The rational relation-
ship was obvious because activity generating the income took place entirely
within West Virginia. Complete Auto clearly controls any commerce clause
question since its factual situation is so close to that of West Virginia
Motor.1
4 5
14 Western Maryland also argued for equal protection, claiming that since trucks were ex-
empt from the gross tax "when the activity is part of an uninterrupted continuation of interstate
transportation," it should be exempt also. The court found this appealing argument to be prema-
ture because the provision for trucks cited by Western Maryland was an amendment applicable
only after the tax years in question. Id. at 248.
In addition, Western Maryland argued that the net income tax base for West Virginia should
be the same as the federal in all respects. It therefore carried back and forward a net operating loss
and showed no West Virginia net income for two years. The court held here that such a benefit
was not intended and referred to the commissioner's discretionary authority to consider federal
income in establishing the net income base for the Carrier Income Tax. Id.
142 282 S.E.2d 240 (W. Va. 1981).
143 In Complete Auto, cars were shipped from outside the state into Mississippi. The taxpayer
picked up the cars at a point within Mississippi and delivered them to a point within Mississippi.
It was the taxation of the compensation received for that transportation which was the issue.
4" Motor Delivery Co., 282 S.E.2d at 249.
1 4 The court ruled against the taxpayer on the collateral issue whether the Tax Department
was estopped from making the assessment involved since under an earlier, but similar, version of
the tax, the Tax Department had taken a position favorable to the taxpayer, which position it had
now abandoned. Id. at 249.
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C. Union Barge
The last case in this trio is Union Barge Line Corp. v. Hardesty. 14 The
barge company engaged in two-point business (origin and destination in West
Virginia), one-point business (either origin or destination in West Virginia)
and pass-through business (neither origin nor destination in West Virginia).
The two-point business income was not in issue, but the income from the other
businesses was.
Union Barge was a Pittsburgh company with no office, employees, agents,
or place of business in West Virginia. Nonetheless, the court found that Union
Barge's wholly in-state business was carried on principally to maintain its one-
point and pass-through business. One-point and pass-through business gener-
ated significantly more income than the relatively small in-state operation.
147
Furthermore, the court found a number of West Virginia contacts: the barges,
owned by the taxpayer for the most part, docked in West Virginia; the tax-
payer charged demurrage; the taxpayer bought food and fuel for its crews and
tugboats from West Virginia businesses; the company sometimes used West
Virginia as a drop-off and pick-up point for its employees, some of whom lived
in West Virginia; the company had repairs done in West Virginia, or, if neces-
sary, sent in its own repair crews.
Relying primarily on Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line, Co.,14s the
court had no difficulty finding a business presence in West Virginia. 149 In Ott,
the barge business was of the one-point variety. But even without Ott and the
other cases cited, it is clear enough that a business presence existed in the case
of the one-point business.
Extending a Penney-type approach to Union Barge, the court viewed the
total activity as establishing a sufficient threshold nexus. The court did not
isolate each activity for this analysis. Had the court done so, perhaps the pass-
through business would have lacked the threshold nexus to subject it to West
Virginia's tax. Yet the tenor of the opinion suggests that the opposite result
may have been reached. While not actually being paid for delivery of goods in
West Virginia, nevertheless Union Barge was plying its trade in that state. It
took advantage of a civilized society to move its barges through West Virginia
as part of its business operation. After finding threshold nexus, the rational
relationship test of due process was easily met because the mileage formula
established that relationship between activities carried on in West Virginia and
the income taxed.150
Union Barge also challenged the tax on the basis that it was not in relation
148 282 S.E.2d 240 (W. Va. 1981).
147 The court noted that traffic between two points within West Virginia comprised only one
fifteen-hundredth (1/1,500) of all of Union Barge's traffic everywhere in 1977. Id. at 251.
148 336 U.S. 169 (1940).
49 Union Barge, 282 S.E.2d at 253.
150 Id. The court was not really dealing with due process but with the apportionment require-
ment under the Complete Auto commerce clause test to avoid multiple taxation. However, appor-
tionment for that purpose should be equally applicable to due process.
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to benefits received from the state - the fourth prong of the Complete Auto
commerce clause test. The court concluded that the taxpayer had not carried
its burden "to show that the inferences of benefits received through its in-state
activities are unfounded.1 51 The court then proceeded to set forth benefits
which the taxpayer appeared to receive from the state and for which the state
could ask return, citing Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney.
1 52
The last part of the opinion contains a plea for taxpayers to come forward
with the kind of evidence necessary to overcome the presumption of constitu-
tionality of the tax laws. The court urged the legislature to rethink its inter-
state commerce tax policy with an eye to fairness under the Complete Auto
standards.153 This gratuitous discussion seems to be an invitation to West Vir-
ginia taxpayers not to give up the fight even though every one of them who has
so far come before the court on constitutional interstate taxation issues, start-
ing with J.C. Penney, has lost. The court also seems to acknowledge implicitly
that it perhaps has reached the outer limits of constitutional permissiveness in
the area of interstate taxation. The court may be signaling that it will take a
slightly different direction in the future.2M
VI. CONCLUSION
As evidenced by the cases discussed here, it is clear that a business pres-
ence to satisfy fourteenth amendment due process will be found almost always
and may well not be limited to the more traditional approach referred to in the
analysis of J.C. Penney, Milacron, and Union Barge. The simple test is
152 Id. at 253.
152 311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940).
While the challenge was phrased in terms of the relation between benefits received and tax
paid, the fourth prong refers to a fair relation between tax paid and "services provided." In an
attempt to show that Montana's severance tax on coal was unconstitutional, Commonwealth
Edison interpreted this test to mean that it must not pay any more tax than the state incurred in
service costs because of the mining. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 620-29
(1981). The court rejected this interpretation because it would permit interstate business to sup-
port only its specific in-state activity while intrastate business would not be so limited and would
have to support the general well-being of the state. The Court went on to find, in so many words,
that the fourth prong was nothing more than an extension of the first prong threshold nexus, a due
process requirement. That extension is simply the rational relationship betwen the in-state activi-
ties and the measure of the tax. This is the due process rational relationship test. Therefore, the
fourth prong in the Complete Auto test virtually has been wiped out, leaving as commerce clause
issues multiple taxation or some other form of discrimination favoring intrastate business over
interstate business. Union Barge was remanded on the apportionment issue to determine the cor-
rect number of miles because the taxpayer alleged that the Ohio River had shifted so that the
taxpayer traveled more Ohio miles than had been accounted for in the formula.
153 Union Barge, 282 S.E.2d at 254-55. There is certainly hope for the legislature's involve-
ment because a Tax Study Commission was established in 1982 to review the entire tax structure
in West Virginia. Its final report is due for the 1984 General Session. House Concurrent Resolution
No. 18, adopted Mar. 13, 1982.
I" Indeed the United States Supreme Court, after a series of victories for state tax admin-
istrators, appears to have put on the brakes in the "unitary business" and "foreign source divi-
dend" areas under state net income taxes. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 102 S.
Ct. 3103 (1982), reh'g denied, 103 S. Ct. 275 (1983) and F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and
Revenue Dep't, 102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982), reh'g denied, 103 S. Ct. 274 (1983).
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whether the taxpayer is to be found plying its trade in West Virginia.' 5L Such a
test is valid and should even reach an interstate mail-order business. However,
expanding the threshold requirement means that the rational relationship test
must be rigorously enforced.
The rational relationship, though, appears not to have been sufficiently
analyzed by the West Virginia court. Most of the court's discussions of appor-
tionment have arisen in the context of, or at least with the emphasis upon, the
commerce clause - avoidance of multiple taxation. The court has easily found
that almost every activity subject to the B & 0 Tax took place wholly within
West Virginia, and that therefore, the tax was self-apportioning, with all pro-
ceeds subject to tax by West Virginia. Self-apportionment was an applicable
concept in the Carrier Income Tax cases where the gross tax was imposed; it
was not always applicable in the B & 0 Tax cases involving interstate sales,
services, and contracting.
The rational relationship required by due process is usually met when net
income is apportioned. But it does not follow that income generated by activi-
ties taxed under a gross receipts tax is self-apportioning, especially when part
of the activity takes place outside the taxing state. Either apportionment or
specific allocation is necessary in those cases to truly meet the rational rela-
tionship requirement - a relationship between the activities taxed and the
income they generate. Those activities generating income in a gross receipts
tax setting must be confined to the taxing state with only the consequent
amount of income thus being taxed.
While apportionment would probably create problems of its own, as was
suggested in the Willis Subcommittee Report,156 it seems to be the most logical
way of satisfying the rational relationship required by due process. Further-
more, apportionment will also avoid multiple taxation and go a long way to
avoid discrimination against interstate business, the second and third Com-
plete Auto commerce clause tests. Another result would be to maintain parity
between intrastate and interstate business because apportionment would avoid
granting interstate business tax exempt status; that business would support
government, as does the local business, but only to the extent to which it oper-
ates in that state.
157
Justice Neely's practical approach set out at the end of Richardson,
Gordon'5 has much to commend it. That is, in sales-of-property cases, let the
destination state impose the tax on the entire sales price. So long as the state
of origin imposes no tax on the same activity or income, no multiple taxation
15 This approach was not adopted by the Willis Subcommittee. It recommended that a gross
receipts tax on sales of tangible personal property not be permitted "unless the company owns or
leases realty in the State or has an employee whose services are performed entirely in the State."
Willis Subcommittee Report, supra note 20 at 1196.
Over the years bills have been introduced in Congress generally reflecting the Subcommittee's
position. The latest of such bills is H.R. 6042.
I" Willis Subcommittee Report, supra note 20, at 1037.
157 See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
15 264 S.E.2d at 612.
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can occur.159 The nasty problem of apportionment disappears.
While this practical approach is sufficient and supportable for commerce
clause purposes, 6 0 it cannot be accepted as a method of satisfying the rational
relationship requirement of due process. Unlike the multiple taxation issue,
when one state can tax all if no other does, due process is an absolute con-
straint on a state's taxing power. Because a business presence in a state is so
easily found, the only remaining real and practical due process limitation on
state taxation of interstate commerce is the rational relationship requirement.
If the rational relationship does not exist in the taxing state between activities
carried on there and the income taxed, the fourteenth amendment absolutely
prohibits that state from imposing its tax-whether some other state forgoes
taxation or not.
119 One of the difficulties with the multiple taxation issue is that the taxpayer seldom proves
there is in fact a tax imposed by more than one state on the same activity or income. If the proof is
so difficult, one might wonder whether in many instances multiple taxation really exists.
160 Technically, both the commerce clause and due process clause require apportionment of
some sort. The commerce clause requirement is "fairly apportioned to activities" and the due pro-
cess requirement is a "rational relationship." See General Motors, 377 U.S. 436, 449-51 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). While these requirements embody much the same test, the commerce clause test
seems generally to have been satisfied where there is no multiple taxation. Compare the majority
opinion in General Motors with Justice Brennan's dissent in the same case.
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